No one can be a friend unless he is a good man. But next to goodness itself, I entreat you to regard friendship as the finest thing in all the world (Cicero, 2005, Kindle Locations 3112-3113).

Introduction

Of all ties, friendship is maybe the most common. It does not require any special regulations; like the relationship between state and human, nor a special prerequisite; like the relationship between parents and the children. In only require a will to friendship, and a consciousness of what a friendship imply, a prerequisite for the will to act on the friendship. Nevertheless, friendship is, like other good ties, pointed toward a common good in respect to the people tied together. The regulations in the relationship between state and human are with the goal of a good society, the requirement of the relationship between parents and children is the parents cooperation for the goal of the common good which is the child, and the ties of friendship is a relationship with the goal of a common goodness and happiness. It is not given that the regulations between state and human always reach the goal of a good society, neither it is given that the relationship between two parents always result in the common good which the child is, and it is neither given that a friendship always will give goodness and happiness. Humans are participating in it, and humans are never perfect in all what they do, but this is nevertheless not of significance for the origin of the goodness in these different relationships. Of importance is the motivation and striving toward a goodness in the relationship, as this is determinative for the goodness of the human and his relationship (Aristotle, 2004; Bruell, 1999). To reach goodness, the nature of goodness must be known. One has to know the reason for his motivation and striving. One has to ask the classical question, that lay the foundation for natural science, and which Socrates used often (Strauss & Cropsey, 2012), The question “What is the nature of X?”, and in this context, the question ‘What is the nature of the good friendship?”

A pointed formulation

To understand the question ‘What is the nature of the good friendship?’ it is not necessary to speak so much of friendship without an understanding of nature. It is after all a question about the nature of friendship, and not the general question ‘What is friendship?’ that can relate to much more than its nature. It may be a question in itself if an understanding of the nature of friendship is enough for a general understanding of the good friendship. Nevertheless, to come to a limited understanding of the nature of friendship, a definition of nature, in this text, is appropriate:

“Nature” means here the character of a thing, or of a kind of thing, the way in which a thing or a kind of thing looks and acts, and the thing, or the kind of thing, is taken not to have been made by gods or men (Strauss & Cropsey, 2012, Kindle Locations 152-154).

The nature of something is then how something works, what its inherent core, mechanism and character is. The question in this text then ask what the core of the good friendship is, what the mechanism of the good friendship is, and what the character of the good friendship is. A question of what separate the good friendship from other relations on these areas. Not only that. The study of nature require, as a starting point, that friendship be taken as not something human creates and not something divine forces has created, but as something occurred as a necessary and a limit in being a human, implying that the human participate in this activity of reasons which have with the necessities and limits of being a human.

The goal of friendship

As a necessity and limit in human, the focus on friendship that has existed since time immemorial is no surprise. Even before specific studies on friendship happened, before the distinction between nature and custom become a possibility (Strauss & Cropsey, 2012), friendship was in the center of the way the world was considered to work in goodness, something which shine through in the message of charity in the Old Testament. As the context the message of charity is given in the Old Testament, it is given as a necessity and a limit of being a human that strives toward and is motivated by a common goodness. As a question of the nature of the good friendship, after the way has been divided into nature (physis) and custom (nomos), is it nevertheless only in the first studies of the nature of friendship that an answer to the question may be found. In this context is Aristotle (2004) one of those in the antiquity that wrote most comprehensive on it.

As for the core in his study on friendship, Aristotle (2004) lay at its foundation the existence of different types of recognized friendship: the useful friendship, the erotic friendship, and the good friendship. The useful friendship is relations where the relation exist on the foundation that it is useful for someone to be in that relation. Business relations is a typical example of this kind of friendship. The erotic friendship is relations where the relation exist on the foundation that someone in it reach an egoistic pleasure. To the end, the good friendship is relations where the relation exist on the foundation that the parts in it together strives toward and are motivated by a common goodness. This good friendship is the only true friendship recognized as such by Aristotle; the friendship built upon goodness as much as it reach for goodness, the friendship that has charity as its core:

Only the friendship of those who are good, and similar in their goodness, is perfect [..] And what is absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant; and these are the most lovable qualities. Therefore it is between good men that both love and friendship are chiefly found in the highest form (p. 205-206).

Of the different recognized friendships described by Aristotle (2004) do only the good friendship has such a nature that it exist on the foundation of a common goodness that reach for a common goodness. This is the only friendship that have something common with the relationship between state and human, and the relationship between parents and their planned children. In this celebration of the good friendship, this is the only friendship of importance since it exist as a mutual relation, and not as the unilaterally relation where the other part is used as a useful object or an object for pleasure. This is not to dismiss the importance of useful and erotic relationships, being a part of nature they are also necessities and limits of the human. However, those kind of relationships does not give any guarantee that the relation is considered a friendship by all the parts, and they are not necessary prolonged to guarantee a study on them on a rational foundation. Only the good friendship has a guarantee that all the parts agree on its nature and nomenclature, and have a potential to be a prolonged relationship. By this reason is the useful and erotic relationships dismissed as true friendship by Aristotle, who terms them analogies to friendship.

The foundation of friendship as given by Aristotle (2004) says not too much about the nature of the friendships. It says much about the goals of the friendships: usefulness, pleasure, or goodness. However, it is a useful distinction of the reason that the goal has an influence on the nature. The goal says something about the way the nature has to work to reach the goal, and such has somewhat a control over the nature of the friendship. Nevertheless, the goal alone does not give the whole truth about the nature of the friendship. As shown in the introduction, not only is the common good a goal for the good friendship, but also for other kind of relationships. The state in its relation with the humans has as a goal a common goodness for all of its members. The parents is in a relationship on the foundation that they strive toward and are motivated by the common good, the child, they are planning. This imply that the goal by itself, as a common goodness, has width and variation, but also that the nature that strive toward and is motivated by the common good has width and variation. The common good is then, more than a goal, a destination mark that marks the accomplishment of the common strivings that has taken place; whether it be a state’s legislation that ensures the goodness of the state’s citizens, the birth of a child, or a friendship’s love and happiness. In the same way, the goals of usefulness and pleasure may be seen as destination marks that mark the accomplishment of the usefulness or pleasure one wanted, without limiting the width and variation of the possible forms of usefulness and pleasures.

The nature of some relationships

The relationship between state and human have in its nature a legal mechanism that seek through rational judgments to reach a common goodness for all its human members. It has in its nature a custom. The humans are given the possibility to create the state, and the possibility of divine rules as the perfect state laws are given (Bruell, 1999); typical features that is not of nature. Nevertheless, there is an understanding of the relationship between state and human as something that is of nature, with a foundation in what is of nature: human’s rational judgements (Strauss & Cropsey, 2012). In this, the foundation of importance for a striving toward the common goodness is found. It is without importance for goodness that humans create the state or that divine laws controls the state, humans do not reach a goodness without striving toward it and decide upon it by rational judgements. However, the presence of divine laws guide the state toward its goal of common goodness, and to the extent divine laws are not accessible, the creation of a rational state get close to the ideal of divine laws and guide the state in the same way toward its goal of common goodness (Bruell, 1999).

The relationship between man and woman with the goal of creating a common goodness, the child, have in its nature a biological gathering resulting in a common good unit. This sexual relation have commonalities with the nature of the erotic friendship in that the latter may involve a sexual relation, but the goal is different. The goal of the erotic friendship is a selfish pleasure, where the relationship of parents has as its goal a common goodness. Nevertheless, the possibility is given that different types of friendship, and relations in toto, develop into a relationship of parents through a change in both the nature and goal. However, it is not possible to ascribe an erotic friendship, which is defined by its goal of pleasure and a defined way to reach that pleasure, the relationship of parents because of the distinctive differences in nature and goal. To difference from the relationship between state and human, it is not an obvious custom in the relationships of parents. Of importance of its nature is the sexual relation that make it possible with a biological unity that is good. Nevertheless, it has historical been a custom, due to the state’s rational judgements; the nature of the state, to regulate the relationship of parents and as such creating in the relationship of parents elements of custom. This rational judgement have not had its foundation in the nature of the relationships of parents, but rather in its goal of the common goodness the creation of a human is, a human that automatically after the conception stands in a relationship to the state. The state has such a responsibility, in its own existence as a rational relation to the humans, for the created human to have a real possibility to a goodness even after its parents has reached its destination marks. To ensure this possibility, on the base that the nature of humans are unpredictable as they are free to choose their relationships, the rational judgements of the state has been to legally regulate this through what is called marriage (Hunt, 1959). This state practice imply that the relationships of parents receive a position that is not only different in nature and goal from other relationships, but also in its freedom. In this respect, one could say, that also the erotic friendship is limited in its freedom since the state regulate sexual relations as well. However, the erotic friendship does not need to be sexual, despite it being a possible, and a common one as such, version of the goal of pleasure (Aristotle, 2004). Further, there is only a limited part of the sexual relations regulated by the state. This imply that only special cases of erotic friendships are limited in its freedom, and as such share this feature with the relationship of parents.

The nature of the good friendship

The good friendship has in common with the relationship between state and human, and the relationship between parents, a goal of a given goodness. It is different from both in the type of goodness as its goal. It is not a child that is striven toward being created, neither is it a goodness including all the members of the state. Nevertheless, it is a relation that is closer to the relationship between state and human than any other relationships. In its nature as consisting of good, rational humans, and in its freedom as natural as the freedom between state and human. It is then of no surprise when Aristotle (2004) classify the good friendship as a necessary tie in the communities, and as a foundational unit in any associations, including those which comprise the state. In difference from the useful friendship and the erotic friendship, the goal of the good friendship is not to take advantage of the other nor reach a selfish pleasure. The good friendship has not a goal of taking, but of giving. To love the other stands higher than being loved. This does not prevent pleasure in the good friendship, but rather gives an absolute pleasure. But the pleasure in the good friendship is not something one strive to reach, it is not a goal but a natural consequence of the good friendship, and as such not a result of a sexual nature but of love:

For goodwill is established by love, quite independently of any calculation of profit: and it is from love, amor, that the word for friendship, amicitia, is derived (Cicero, 2005, Kindle Locations 2612-2614).

The nature of the good friendship coinciding with the goal of the good friendship, but also its freedom. The goodness only seeks itself, and through that which is good: through the rationality, through confidence, through equality, through love, and with the good friendship as its symbol, all this through a common unit consisting of two or more parts. Because the good friendship, to difference from other relationships in making three; nature, goal and freedom, to one, goodness, is a coinciding in human hearts: ‘The significance of friendship is that it unites human hearts’ (Cicero, 2005, Kindle Locations 3030-3031).

Where the relationship of parents was a biological coincidence with the goal of the good child, the good friendship is an emotional coincidence in love with a goal of rationality, confidence, equality and love. In the good friendship, the friends love each other on the condition of goodness alone, and they share with each other their personalities, their experience, emotions, knowledge, pleasures, sorrows, empathy, respect, their homes, time, and space: they share everything that in goodness may be shared and contribute to the unity and diversity of goodness:

We shared the same house, we ate the same meals, and we ate them side by side. Together we were soldiers, together we travelled, together we went for our country holidays. Every minute of our spare time, as you know, we devoted to study and research, withdrawn from the eyes of the world but enjoying the company of one another. If my recollection of all these doings had perished with Scipio when he died, the loss of my friend, who was so utterly close and dear to me, would be unendurable. But the picture of them in my mind has not passed away. My memory keeps the vision alive – and it becomes even more wonderful as time goes on (Cicero, 2005, Kindle Locations 3105-3110).

A celebration of the good friendship

The position of the good friendship has never been as clearly as in the antiquity. Nevertheless, it has stand strong through the whole western history, both as an important part of religion but also as a foundational unit in social science; an unit that at all has made it possible for the society to exist. Despite this, the clarity of the good friendship – the consciousness of the answer to the question ‘What is the nature of the good friendship?’ – has partly crumbled away in a confusion with other relationships that has something in common with it or is somewhat similar to it. A confusion that the Countess of Champagne in 1174 tried to prevent with her known proclamation:

We declare and we hold as firmly established that love cannot exert its powers between two people who are married to each other. For lovers give each other everything freely, under no compulsion of necessity, but married people are in duty bound to give in to each other’s desires and deny themselves to each other in nothing (Hunt, 1959, p. 143-144).

The need to celebrate the good friendship that in its wholeness is good may be unnecessary. Rather, the crumbling of the consciousness guarantees a necessity of celebrating it. New kind of relationships, like in example the romantic relationship that has emerged over the last five hundred years, and that contributed to a confluence of the erotic friendship, the good friendship, and the relationship of parents (Hunt, 1959; Lewis, 2002) have made it difficult to understand what the good friendship is. However, also the increasing emphasis on social norms and rules in friendship, which challenge the requirements of the good friendship to meet the other on the foundation of goodness alone, contribute to a crumbling and a confusion of what the good friendship is. To celebrate the good friendship is as such to create an awareness of the good friendship in its noble costume and create an awareness of the necessity of the good friendship for the life of humans, since ‘without affection and kindly feeling life can hold no joys’ (Cicero, 2005, Kindle Location 3098).

The good friendship is not sexual in its nature, but the good friendship can be intimately, and can be a part in something that develop to a relationship of parents. Other kinds of friendship and relationships, like the erotic friendship, can also develop into a good friendship given the right assumptions (Aristotle, 2004; Lewis, 2002). However, the good friendship, defined by the mutual goodness in its unity and diversity, can never become another type of relationship with other qualities without getting lost. The good friendship will forever exist independent of new kinds of relationships and new social trends, but the consciousness of it can crumble. A consciousness, if Aristotle (2004) was right, also is a consciousness of the existence of society.

Bibliography

Aristotle. (2004). The Nicomachean Ethics. UK: Penguin Books.

Bruell, C. (1999). On the Socratic Education: An Introduction to the Shorter Platonic Dialogues. (Kindle Edition) UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Cicero. (2005). On the Good Life. (Kindle Edition) UK: Penguin Books.

Hunt, M. M. (1959). The Natural History of Love. US: Alfred A. Knopf.

Lewis, C. S. (2002). The Four Loves. (Kindle Edition) UK: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.

Strauss, L. & Cropsey, J. (2012). History of Political Philosophy. (Kindle Edition). US: The University of Chicago Press.